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Better use of large scale health data has the potential to benefit
patient care, public health, and research. The handling of such
data, however, raises concerns about patient privacy, even when
the risks of disclosure are extremely small.
The problems are illustrated by recent English initiatives trying
to aggregate and improve the accessibility of routinely collected
healthcare and related records, sometimes loosely referred to
as “big data.” One such initiative, care.data, was set to link and
provide access to health and social care information from
different settings, including primary care, to facilitate the
planning and provision of healthcare and to advance health
science.1 Data were to be extracted from all primary care
practices in England. A related initiative, the Clinical Practice
Research Datalink (CPRD), evolved from the General Practice
Research Database (GPRD). CPRD was intended to build on
GPRD by linking patients’ primary care records to hospital data,
around 50 disease registries and clinical audits, genetic
information from UK Biobank, and even the loyalty cards of a
large supermarket chain, creating an integrated data repository
and linked services for all of England that could be sold to
universities, drug companies, and non-healthcare industries.
Care.data has now been abandoned and CPRD has stalled. The
flawed implementation of care.data plus earlier examples of
data mismanagement have made privacy issues a mainstream
public concern. We look at what went wrong and how future
initiatives might gain public support.
Why have English big data initiatives not
worked?
Key elements for success of big health data projects include
public confidence that records are held securely and anonymised
appropriately (information security)2; public awareness of and
engagement with how their personal data have been, or might
be, used2; and data being used for high quality science.
Care.data failed to earn the trust and confidence of patients,
citizens, and healthcare professionals.2 An analysis of opinions
reported on Twitter showed that people had concerns about
informed consent and the default “opt-in”; trust; privacy and
data security; the involvement of private companies; and
legality.3 The information campaign about care.data was not
clear about how the system would work, including the opt-out
arrangements and the sharing of personal information with
commercial organisations,4 5 and at times downplayed the
potential benefits.
This highlights a broader problem about public perception of
how data are used andmanaged. A recent literature review found
that many people do not know how patient information is
currently used or who can use it.6 But focus groups found that
participants becomemore accepting of big health data uses after
being given more information.7
Researchers currently get access to large scale healthcare data
(such as CPRD) in England through copies sent to their local
computers. This makes it difficult to monitor or control how
the data are used, leading to stories of data mismanagement and
newspaper headlines such as “Millions of patient records were
sold to insurance firms who used it to set their critical illness
premiums in a series of unacceptable lapses.”8 Concerns have
also been expressed by patient groups and in UK parliament
about data protection being compromised by data being uploaded
to the Google cloud to access more powerful analytic tools.9
Basic anonymisation of information (such as removing names,
addresses, and other identifiable information) has been widely
used to allay public concerns about use of personal data for
research data. However, the challenge with linking different
sources of information (such as with care.data or CPRD) is the
increasing level of detail in the data and possibility of deductive
disclosure. For example, this could occur if a person discloses
on social media that they visited their practice on some dates
and were admitted to hospital with flu.
Clearly, we need to get public support by including them in
developing ways to make better use of health data.
Unfortunately, so far, efforts here have been piecemeal. There
are research led activities informing the public through social
media such as the #datasaveslives campaign (www.
datasaveslives.eu) and ad hoc media briefings by academics.
Another example is the citizens’ jury in which members of the
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public are provided with different perspectives to discuss. A
recent jury found that when informed of both the risks and
opportunities associated with health data sharing, the public
believe an individual’s right to privacy should not prevent
research that can benefit patients overall. It concluded that
patients should be notified of information sharing schemes and
have the right to opt out if they so choose.10 In her recent review
on data security, consent, and opt outs, the UK national data
guardian, Fiona Caldicott, found that the case for data sharing
still needs to be made to the public.11
Another key factor in gaining public support is showing that
science from such projects is credible. The need to replicate
findings across heterogeneous populations and settings is well
recognised.12 However, the medical literature is plagued with
specious findings, often made from observational studies using
routine healthcare data.13 Some studies have even reached
conflicting results from the same data sources—for example, a
study that found an increased risk of cancer with glucose
lowering drugs using the GPRD was contradicted a few years
later by another that found no effect on cancer risk.14 15 A
particular barrier to replication is that algorithms and lists of
clinical codes are not published alongside research papers.
What has worked elsewhere?
Large databases in other countries have managed to obtain
public support. Unlike the English examples above, the Welsh
Secure Anonymous Information Linkage (SAIL) system
researchers go to the data rather than have the data sent to them.
SAIL contains a large number of datasets and a platform for
sharing knowledge about using the data. It operates a remote
access system providing secure data access for approved users
and data analysis tools.16 The Scottish Health Informatics
Programme (SHIP) also developed ways for researchers to
manage and analyse electronic patient records and associated
linked data. SHIP ran a substantial public engagement
programme aimed at understanding the public’s preferences,
interests, and concerns about use of health data for research and
their acceptance and attitudes towards the aims of the
programme. This enabled SHIP to define a transparent and
publicly acceptable approach to governance of research with
health data.17
Outside the UK, the Canadian Network for Observational Drug
Effect Studies (CNODES) uses a system of sending analysis
queries to local data repositories across the country with the
results combined centrally in a meta-analysis.18A large US data
source, Mini-Sentinel, collates healthcare data from around 100
million people and also uses distributed queries,19 and PCORnet
(www.pcornet.org) marks a ramping up of US investment in
this area. The Nordic countries routinely extend their health
data linkage to income and educational attainment records.20
What should we do now?
Public involvement is key to successful use of large scale health
data.21 The public need to be able to access clear, high quality,
up-to-date summaries of the scientific discoveries and healthcare
improvements made using data from healthcare records. This
would improve patient trust, reduce opt-outs, and let patients
share the value of data sharing. Such summaries should be
produced by the academic community in collaboration with
patients and staff with skills in engaging and involving the
public. Producing this resource will be a full time job and
requires funders to recognise its ethical importance and practical
value.
There may also be lessons from wider policy arenas where
public acceptance is crucial to success. Renewable energy is
one such contentious area, with apparent contradictions in public
opinion—for example, the apparent general public support for
renewable energy and simultaneous difficulty in implementing
specific local projects.22 Developing a greater understanding of
the dimensions of social acceptance seems just as relevant to
use of large scale health data as it is to renewable energy.
Public trust is more likely if researchers are seen to meet high
scientific standards through transparency in their methods and
reproducibility of findings. The scientific community is showing
increasing interest in improving reproducibility.23 24One proposal
is the e-laboratory, a shared digital laboratory supporting
consistent recording, description, and sharing of data and
statistical algorithms, facilitating rapid replication of findings.25
Registration of protocols and publications in registers may
further strengthen the reliability and credibility of studies using
big data.26
Transparency and visible uses of data are also important for
public trust.2 One approach could be to document where and
how each person’s data have been used. Administering this is
likely to be challenging from a communications perspective—for
example, explaining to non-affected people why they were
included (as a control) in a study of schizophrenia. A more
complex approach is dynamic consent, where people can see
which organisations have accessed their data, get information
on data analyses, and change their consent preferences for
specific uses over time.27 Prototypes for this are being
developed.28 Individuals’ views on different types of data use
may vary and thus imposing “all or nothing” choices on opt-out
risks losing data from people who are happy with most uses but
sufficiently concerned about specific uses to opt out of all data
sharing.
Public confidence in information security is pivotal. Aworkshop
organised by the Academy ofMedical Sciences (among others)
proposed that sensitive data should be stored and analysed in
centralised “safe havens,” arguing that data security risks can
then bemanaged better by segregating sensitive data, controlling
data access, and monitoring data uses.29 In order for safe havens
to operate efficiently (at low cost and rapid responsiveness) they
will need to facilitate different uses of the same data. But they
also need to engage with the communities and clinical teams
providing the data in order to get people to relate what is
happening with their data.30
Many researchers prefer to download data rather than access
them through safe havens.31 One way to improve data security
and transparency for this approach is to use distributed analysis
in which individual level data are analysed locally and only
summary results or intermediate statistics are downloaded to
and shared with researchers. A federation of local safe havens,
known as Arks, is being developed, linked to the Connected
Health Cities pilots in northern England.32
The ultimate solution, however, must combine new technologies
with clear accountability, transparent operations, and public
trust. In addition, data stewardship is not just about physical
and digital security: staff training, standard operating procedures,
and the skills and attitudes of staff are also important.33 This
combination of data protection (safe havens) and culture of best
practice not only underpins a trustworthy research environment
but also a learning health system.34 35
Conclusion
Most people would expect a health service to monitor clinical
outcomes so that quality of care and the effects of interventions
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can be assessed. Such activities, by definition, need people’s
healthcare data. If the UK is to make use of its globally
important health data assets key stakeholders in health systems
must act together to properly resource meaningful, enduring
public involvement in big health data.
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Key messages
Success of big health data projects requires public confidence that records are held securely and anonymised appropriately
Public support requires that data use is transparent and produces credible science
The public need to be able to see and share the benefits of big data projects
Dynamic consent, enabling people to opt out of specific uses could increase support
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